

Local Enhancers for Peace:

Managing post-conflict risks and promoting reconciliation through edutainment after war

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Abstract:

This paper introduces the foundations of a novel behavioral informed policy initiative that draws on trust, as an internal enhancer of peace, to locally manage post-conflict risks. As a complementary bottom-up alternative to standard peacebuilding models, traditionally promoted by international aid agencies, the cornerstones of the policy model proposed here aims to develop a persuasion strategy to foster affective trust, outgroup trust, and trust in government. It targets these dimensions of trust because they predict positive perceptions towards reconciliation, the most important process and final outcome of peacebuilding efforts. The main argument is that *by fostering affective trust, positive perceptions of reconciliation reduce the probability of relapse generated by post-conflict risks related to intergroup violence, legitimacy of the process and compliance with the rule of law*. Drawing on the recent literature, the paper presents a framework to answer the question of how local enhancers for peacebuilding can help manage post-conflict risks at the local level while fostering a cost-effective and sustainable path towards reconciliation. The final section introduces the reader to an evidence-based intervention design that is oriented to implement a randomized control trial in 5 departments of Colombia heavily affected by the country's protracted armed conflict. The goal of this intervention design is to answer the question of how using behavioral insights we can device local enhancers for peacebuilding that can help communities manage post-conflict risks at the local level while fostering a sustainable path towards reconciliation.

Keywords: Trust, Post-Conflict Risks, Reconciliation, Prosocial behavior, Social Norms, Behavioral policies, Micro-level Peacebuilding.

Capstone

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Motivation and acknowledgements

This capstone aims to solve a puzzle: how can citizens and governments assure that peace is not worse than war. I synthesizes a complex set of behavioral and decision science problems an apply them to a real life ongoing challenge that was not previously addressed in the field of peace studies and international aid. This research paper uses the insights learned through the MBDS coursework, and also builds upon my previous academic and professional experience, and as a researcher in the fields of peace science, public policy, and international development. First ideas on this work were presented on the 2018 version of GRAD Ben Talks at the University of Pennsylvania¹. Chris Nave and the MBDS Program made this work possible thanks to the generous support that allowed me to present the empirical foundations of this paper at the “Governance, Aid, and Civil Conflict” panel at the Seventy Sixth Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago in march 2018. I specially thank to Nathalie Méndez, Juan F Pino and Evgenia Jane Kitaevich for their contribution to the data analysis that supports this capstone.

I am especially grateful by the comments and suggestions of professors Enrique Fatas, Nazli Bhatia, Zev Berger, Emile Bruneau and Cristina Bicchieri. Their courses, seminars, work and conversations, inspired and shaped the ideas that structured this capstone project. Through this work I aim to build bridges between fields that benefit from a fertile dialogue, specially helping to avoid the traditional ineffective over spending of trillions of dollars, and the broken promises from the international community and local governments to citizens and ex-combatants around the world.

I believe behavioral science can refresh the way we understand old problems with new lenses, alternatives and solutions to help societies live happier, healthier, and safer lives, that are free from the suffering that artificial conditions pose on billions of people and that can be avoided and unrooted with science through creativity, political will and civic engagement. I dearly hope that this work helps fills a gap on the fields and practice committed to build peace around the world, and specially to apply it in my beloved country, Colombia, to contribute with effective ways to

¹ [https://www.academia.edu/36837513/How can we make peace less worse than war](https://www.academia.edu/36837513/How_can_we_make_peace_less_worse_than_war)

face the uncertainty and challenges that come with the brave decision to stop a 53 year old fratricide.

The work is dedicated to Catalina González for her loving and moving presence throughout the incredible life-changing adventure that has been life at the MBDS and Penn. I am grateful to my family, specially to Emilia, my mother the tireless fighter that keeps giving me infinite lessons with her endless strength and love for life.

Introduction

At the dusk of the 21st century, many societies initiated peace processes to end long civil conflicts. Nevertheless, many countries have failed to overcome political and social violence. They face the risk of falling into conflict traps (Collier & Sambanis, 2002), while the social divisions produced by war continue to deepen. Traditional views of international aid deal with post-conflict risks focusing on external safeguards (military or third-party presence), leaving internal enhancers of peace playing a somewhat subsidiary role (Casas et al, 2018: 3). Trust has long been the usual suspect when addressing the drivers that can positively influence intergroup relations, post-conflict risk management and sustainable peacebuilding at large (Alon and Bar-Tal, 2016). Surprisingly, most conflict resolution, peacebuilding studies, and intervention strategies deal with trust as a dependent variable (Casas et al, 2018: 4). This aspect may explain the gap in the literature regarding trust as a resource for peacebuilding. Then it is fair to ask: How trust matters for managing post-conflict risks? If it does, how can trust be fostered to help peacebuilding efforts and their sustainability?

This paper presents the ‘foundations’ of a behavioral informed policy model that draws on local enhancers of peace directed to locally manage post-conflict risks. The importance of cooperative infrastructures² is inspired by the need for building local capacities where institutions are weak. In

² Fehr, Fischbacher & Gächter (2002: 3), affirm that: “even in modern human societies with a large cooperative infrastructure in the form of laws, impartial courts and the police, the material incentive to cheat on cooperative agreements is probably the rule rather than the exception. This is so because, in general, not all obligations that arise in the various contingencies of exchange situations can be unambiguously formulated and subjected to a binding contract. Therefore, by renegeing on the implicit or unenforceable obligations a party can always improve its material payoff relative to a situation where it meets its obligations. Of course, in [...] societies that lack a cooperative infrastructure, cheating incentives are even more prevalent. It is probably true that in more than 90 percent of human history no cooperative infrastructure, as mentioned above, existed”.

this paper I argue that the idea of cooperative infrastructure must be recategorized, not only to address formal institutions product of intentional design, but to include informal institutions as the underlying organic basic social and organizational structures needed for the operation of a society or any human collective enterprise. I propose the use of the expression social infrastructure as a comprehensive broader term that integrates conventions, moral rules and social norms as the evolutionary ancestors of formal cooperative infrastructures that emerged and evolved to solve the problem of social order. These notion follows Mantzavinos' (2001) and Manztavinos et al (2004) strive for an internal view of institutions as shared mental models, and not just as famously defined by Douglass North as the (external) rules of the Game. In contexts characterized by high uncertainty, they can contribute as an organic source of sustainability for virtuous policy processes and their prosocial outcomes, such as peace (Eckel et al, 2016).

In the following pages, I first offer a literature review on the relationship between post-conflict risks, peacebuilding, and trust. Drawing on the results of an available database, section two discusses the available post-conflict risk reduction models and the complementary value of trust as a bottom-up governance structure (Dyer & Chu, 1993; Sako, 1998). The final section introduces an evidence-based intervention design that is oriented to implement a randomized control trial in 5 departments of Colombia heavily affected by the country's protracted armed conflict. The goal of this intervention design is to answer the question of how local enhancers for peacebuilding can help manage post-conflict risks at the local level while fostering a sustainable path towards reconciliation.

I. Literature motivation and preliminary research results

Post-conflict peace is typically fragile: nearly half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses (Collier & Hoeffler, 2008). In 2015, Pettersson and Wallensteen (2014) reported that in spite of a positive trend regarding the number of peace agreements reached, several peace processes remained unstable. Many countries fail to overcome political and social violence falling into "conflict traps" (Collier & Sambanis, 2002; Hegre et al, 2011), while the social divisions produced by the war continue to deepen (Walter, 2011). There is little consensus on the most effective policies to avert conflicts or promote postwar recovery (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). As Collier and Hoeffler (2008) have argued, post-conflict societies face two distinctive challenges: economic

recovery and the reduction of the risk of a recurring conflict. As these authors empirically assessed, aid and policy reforms have been found to be effective in economic recovery. However, their results seem skeptical on the power of political measures of transitional institutions to manage the risk of violent relapse.

The literature on post-conflict risks suggests that weak institutional settings face the challenge of persistent societal violence, the presence of criminal organizations, and low expectations regarding the performance of institutions to channel conflict and provide justice (Casas & Méndez, 2016). Legalistic remedies, expressed through formal reforms and top-down administrative transformations, fall short to generate a coordinated change in expectations and behaviors that will reduce relapse. On their empirical assessment of policy models, Collier and Hoeffler confirmed that post-conflict risk management in settings as the described above relies upon external safeguards³. Their results rule out aid to foster internal enhancers, such as grassroots processes and citizen dispositions and motivations, playing a somewhat subsidiary role (Casas, 2018).

Following Blattman & Miguel (2010), I argue that the high variance of the occurrence of post-conflict risks -and the previous restriction of available micro-level and meso-level cross-national data in previous analysis- can explain the blind spot of mainstream policy models that focus on external safeguards. The first step that must be taken in order to empirically explore how trust can act as a buffer to post-conflict risks, is to treat it as an independent variable to establish what of its domains are involved and isolate their effects on key processes and outcomes regarding peace.

Peacebuilding models and Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration and Rebuilding processes (DDRR) are normative frameworks that orient policy interventions to facilitate the transitions. In both frameworks the key social process and outcome factor is reconciliation. As Casas et al (2018: 9) reviewed, reconciliation has been identified as the fundamental ingredient of successful post-conflict societies. In most accounts, reconciliation focuses on the re-establishment of interaction between antagonists or different actors in a post-conflict era, or the restoration of previously

³ I borrow the notion of external safeguards from Sako's (1998) excellent analysis on trust-based governance structures and her position on the limited power of external safeguards to reduce environmental uncertainty.

existing harmonious relationships. The empirical gap remains on the specific causes and means to attain reconciliation.

Using the database from a cross-sectional multi-method field study developed between 2015 and 2017 in 5 regions of Colombia, Casas et al (2018) assessed the impact of three dimensions of trust (interpersonal, in the outgroup and in government) on reconciliation. Their findings suggest that rather on drawing exclusively on economic development, investing in local governance infrastructures could be an complementary asset to help reduce the rate at which violent conflicts relapse. Recently, Casas et al (2018) found that trust in ex-combatants and victims (outgroup trust) and in the government (political/institutional trust) increases the likelihood of having positive perceptions towards reconciliation (See Table 1 in the appendix section) and a motivation to support the peace process (See Table 2 in appendix section).

The independent variables included in their analysis (Casas et al, 2018: 15) are attitudinal variables that measure different types of interpersonal trust, trust in ex-combatants and national government, in departments heavily affected by violence. In the representative survey, trust in the national government was measured on a scale of 1 to 4, where 4 represented that the citizens highly trusted the national government and 1 represented low trust ($M = 2.48$, $SD = .97$). Interpersonal trust was measured on a scale of 1 to 4, where 4 indicated high levels of trust in family and friends, and 1 for low trust ($M = 2.71$, $SD = .63$). Finally, outgroup trust was measured regarding trust on ex-combatants ($M = 1.53$, $SD = 1.52$) and victims of war ($M = 1.99$, $SD = 1.60$). This measure was based on aggregate indices of three questions that in both cases asked on a scale of 1 to 4, if the participants would be willing to have as neighbors ex-combatants or victims; allow their children to study with children of demobilized persons or victims, and to vote for candidates who are demobilized or former victims in future elections. The indices were constructed based on Cronbach's Alpha coefficient.

These results are important given that nearly half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses (Collier and Hoeffler, 2008). This threat is greatly amplified when States and societies lack the institutional and community support to manage risks coming from: a) high levels of societal violence originated by outgroup conflict; b) hurdles for reintegration and incentives for ex-

combatant recidivism; c) the absence of effective local conflict resolution mechanisms that resonate with the rule of law and connect with the institutional offer; d) and the perverse presence of illegal and extractive economies controlled by criminal armed groups (Casas & Méndez, 2016). The research question that will drive the further pages, is how individual-level interventions targeting trust could mitigate violent conflict escalation more broadly by increasing *positive feelings* toward the outgroup; and how macro-moderators such as political/institutional trust may help cognitive reappraisal about state capacity to reduce uncertainty during the transition to peace.

Addressing Post-conflict from the Bottom-Up

Casas, Méndez & Pino (2018) offer evidence that serves as a cornerstone for a complementary policy model that have might be neglected given the scarce empirical evidence to support it. This evidence supports the claim for a heavier focus on internalities, social norms and institutional strengthening in specific post-conflict settings. Built on the premise that trust is one of the most important factors in intergroup relations, conflict management and resolution at large (Alon and Bar-Tal, 2016), the next section focus on the question of how certain domains of trust can help reduce the rate at which these conflicts repeat themselves over time.

The problem with external measures expressed mostly as legalistic remedies, as Sitkin & Roth (1993) show, is that organizations frequently adopt formal rules, contracts, or other legalistic mechanisms when interpersonal trust is lacking. They offer evidence that supports the fact that such legalistic "remedies" for trust-related problems are ineffective in restoring its reestablishment in the context of the transition from war to peace. Despite the mixed results that characterize the research literature on the impact that war has had in different domains of trust (Méndez, 2014), this paper follows Bauer et al (2014: 47) evidence regarding that "greater exposure to war created a lasting increase in people's egalitarian motivations toward their in-group, but not their out-groups [...] These "war effects" are predictions from evolutionary approaches that emphasize the importance of group cooperation in defending against external threats". This fact is consistent with a trend in recent experimental field research in economics, that finds that internal armed conflicts have negative effects on some domains of trust but not on others, such as ingroup trust in some specific contexts (Méndez, 2014).

The value of the outgroup and political/institutional dimensions of trust, and their power to develop governance structures (Sako, 1998) has been implicit for decades in the literature and practice interested in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The evidence presented above supports the idea that traditional policy models can be complemented by an internal-enhancers perspective (e.g. resources and driving forces existing at the micro-level) that can make peace more secure and sustainable. Following Walter's (2011; 33), conclusion that investing in governance infrastructures may be the most effective resource to resolve relapsing civil wars, fostering. The big question is how can peace be built from the Bottom-up?


One of the few accounts that deal with this specific question is the one recently published by Ditlmann and colleagues (2017:39). They argue that each year substantial resources are committed to interventions engaging citizens with aspirations to “build peace” in contexts affected by violent conflict. As they show, the tremendous toll of violent intergroup conflict—including upward of 2 million deaths since 1989 (Melander, 2015), and the pronounced gap in quality of life between countries affected by violent conflict in contrast those not affected (World Bank, 2011)—motivates these interventions. Ditlmann et al (2017), find that the current evidence base is quite small, does not cover the diversity of relevant contexts, and gives too little attention to resources and capacities that enable people to engage in conflict mitigation behaviors. They conclude that researchers and policymakers should go beyond thinking only about improving attitudes to start thinking about resources and capacities for such behaviors, and contextual conditions that constrain behavior. The authors offer a framework (Figure 1) that ties together three factors: (1) participants' own appraisals about threats to peace between groups and of their personal resources to take action (micro-level); (2) peace-building behaviors that have the possibility to de-escalate conflict in the broader communities (meso-level); and (3) contextual factors that moderate the effects of peace-building behaviors (macro-level).

They recommend that those designing programs and researching them should consider how contextual factors, such as political institutions and group endowments, determine barriers to conflict mitigation. The primary message of their review is for those studying and designing micro-level conflict mitigation interventions to go beyond thinking about improving attitudes to thinking about conflict-mitigating behaviors, the resources and capacities needed to undertake such behaviors, and the contextual conditions that constrain behavior. Their framework yields

hypotheses about how citizen-oriented interventions might affect societal-level conflict dynamics. It also outlines what kinds of outcomes researchers should evaluate in assessing contributions to conflict mitigation. Yet, the effectiveness of interventions to influence the conflict is moderated by contextual factors like groups' access to material resources, their positions in society, and political institutions.

A first step towards a Bottom-up strategy is offered by Ditlmann et al (2017; 38-39), who explore how might interventions that engage ordinary citizens in settings of violent conflict affect broader conflict dynamics. They develop a framework to analyze processes through which individual-level interventions could mitigate violent conflict escalation more broadly. They posit that interventions at the micro-level may increase *positive feelings* toward the outgroup, as well as psychological, social, and material resources among participants. These have the potential to influence behaviors such as policing of the ingroup, public advocacy, and political action that can contribute to peace.

Figure 1



Ditlmann et al (2017: 46)

Ditlmann et al (2017: 9) find that the link between micro-level interventions on the one hand and conflict escalation dynamics on the other, is via peace-building behaviors. They draw on the current literature to examine three classes of peace-building behavior that address the threat of intergroup conflict after war: (1) policing ingroup members to stop or prevent them from acting

aggressively toward the outgroup, (2) public advocacy for de-escalation that can persuade or spread pro-peace norms by allowing peace-seekers to recognize that others share their point of view, and (3) political action to put those who support intergroup peace into positions of power or pressure those currently in positions of power to change their stance (Ditlmann et al (2017:49). They also show how macro-level contextual factors, such as political institutions and group status, shape the kinds of behavioral strategies that ordinary citizens might take up in contributing to conflict mitigation (Ditlmann et al, 2017: 70-71).

Ditlmann et al posit the need for more reflection among those studying and designing citizen-targeted peace-building programs to more clearly articulate causal pathways to societal change via behaviors targeting group dynamics and collective processes (Ditlmann et al, 2017: 49). This, they say, would allow for more compelling research into whether such programs can contribute to conflict mitigation in ways that go beyond changes in participants' attitudes or personal values. In sum, the role of researchers is to provide policymakers stronger evidence on whether and how to apply the vast sums of resources available to enable citizens and officials to be effective agents in mitigating post-conflict threats such as intergroup violence.

II. Fostering trust to manage post-conflict risks: A framework

The previous sections presents a framework to guide an actual intervention in a country that faces the challenges of an undergoing peace process. To understand how outgroup trust and trust in government may serve as internal enhancing drivers to manage locally some post-conflict risks and support reconciliation is important to keep in mind that war disrupts the core foundations of social order. It erodes the fragile equilibrium that solves the two central problems that generate its emergence: the need for protection against threats and mistrust generated by high levels of environmental uncertainty (Mantzavinos, 2001; Chapter 1 & 2). This is expressed in high information scarcity (Berger 2018:14). In many ways, internal armed conflicts breach what Robinson (1999) denominates the underlying psychological contract, a tacit bond between citizens and their political organization that reduces environmental uncertainty based on shared beliefs about regularities that result from the enforcement of rules. It does because States fail to provide the external safeguards to avoid a social iterated N person Prisoner's Dilemma. If social order can be seen, from an internal perspective, as a byproduct of the emergence of informal institutions that

underlie the formal scaffold of the State; then the common knowledge (Dedeo, 2017) that reproduces these institutions from the cognitive point of view, is not enough to domesticate the generalized risk generated by the multiple actors in a conflict.

Post-conflict scenarios are characterized by high epistemic uncertainty (Berger, 2018:18) given the disruption of the previous wartime order (Arjona, 2014), resulting in a high-cost information environment that makes trust scarce (Berger, 2018). As Bauer et al (2014: 55) argue, it is plausible that intergroup conflict represents but one type of personal insecurity—a broader domain that includes other events or threats, such as those created by floods, pathogens, earthquakes, and famines, as well as war. The idea underlying their hypotheses is that people have evolved to respond to insecurity by shifting their investment from building a broader sphere of positive-sum interactions to managing risk by investing more heavily in their kin, their close personal relationships, and their in-group.

As Berger (2018: 18), environments characterized by apparent motivational uncertainty require novel epistemic machinery to guide one's action. Trust can foster intergroup warm expectations (Berger, 2018:18) to avoid parochial altruism and punishment reducing the probability of intergroup prejudice (Paluck & Green, 2010), collective blaming (Bruneau et al, 2018), competitive victimhood (Noor et al, 2012), vicarious retribution (Lickel et al, 2006) or dehumanization (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017; Leidner et al, 2012). Additionally, it may help ease the pressures ex-combatants face in returning to civilian life and to their families (Casas & Méndez, 2016). Thus, reducing the probability of relapse of group violence. Trust can also foster cognitive mobilization of support toward public officials, organizations and political institutions by the local population (Wong, 2016); and motivate commitment and compliance with the law. On the side of public officials and the institutions, commitment and compliance will be motivate towards the people they represent or serve on the territory (De Juan & Pierskalla, 2016).

This is important given that in contexts where institutions are weak, commitments and threats from the State are not credible among members of the general population. In such a context, social norms can provide low-cost information environment regarding context-relevant cooperation (Berger, 2018:16). In particular, affective trust (Berger, 2018:17) can set the foundations to build

outgroup trust and rebuild the broken promises and the legacies left by the shocks of war⁴. Affective trust offers the epistemic resources to update and overcome uncertainty. Social norms can cue positive affect of trustors towards trustees, thus providing bottom-up governance structures. Social norms foster reactive attitudes (Berger, 2018: 18) that can crowd-out spoiler attitudes and behaviors against peace. The literature shows that introducing a new social norm, is an effective strategy to generate out-group trust with the benefit of lasting effects through time (Paluck, 2009; Tankard & Paluck, 2016; Berger, 2018).

Social norms rely on the importance of social proof to support collective shifting from the social equilibrium of war to the new social equilibrium of peace. Following Bhatia (2018) social proof is a powerful persuasion mechanism, it obeys to our human tendency to figure out what we think by figuring out what others think. The effect of social proof is conformity, it can be rational (i.e., informational) or non-rational (i.e., normative). Social proof generates conformity in ambiguous situations where information is scarce and costly, and uncertainty is high. The behavior of others provides convincing information and results in a private acceptance observed through attitude change. Nevertheless, competing views argue that rather than social the source of conformity can be epistemic in specific settings (Fatas et al, 2018). However, there is scarce evidence on how trust in government (political/institutional trust) might be fostered from the bottom-up. The mainstream literature on the topic focuses on top-down mechanisms and macro-perspectives drawing mostly on civilian-military cooperation, legal remedies and political reforms (De Juan & Pierskalla, 2016; García Ponce & Pasquale, 2014; Blind, 2006). The lessons of history might make one tempted to credit certain types of leadership, specifically charismatic types as pivotal elements fast institutional trust building.

In sum, evidence suggests that any intervention to foster trust in a post-conflict setting would benefit from targeting both outgroup trust and trust in government from a bottom-up perspective,

⁴ Berger (2018: 17) defines affective trust as: “A warm expectation, with corresponding reactive attitudes, that an agent will act cooperatively to obtain some ends, apt to arise in light of an identified social norm”. My take is that affective trust involves system one, so it can be a fast reaction that can help penetrate the hard core of biases and mental rigidities that are the source of persistent shared mental models that give rise to cognitive path-dependence. This microlevel phenomena has not been yet deepened by political economy, international development studies or the violent conflict literature.

drawing on the affective dimension of trust. It can foster intergroup *warm dispositions* to avoid the probability of *relapse of inter-group violence*. Affective trust can also help State officials to build *legitimacy* and political/institutional trust through *commitment* and *compliance*. But how can warm dispositions among the population and the local official be generated to increase trust in government and possibly strong dispositions towards reconciliation?

III. *Building peace through an affective trust-based intervention using social norms.*

In this section, I present a framework oriented to be operationalized and implemented through a randomized control trial in 5 departments of Colombia heavily affected by the country's protracted armed conflict. As part of a larger applied research endeavor, the paper introduces the intervention strategy of a novel behavioral informed policy initiative that uses local enhancers of peace directed to locally manage post-conflict risks. The strength of this proposal comes from the fact that it aims to offers a behavioral informed mechanism, that it is scalable in the context of an ongoing context facing the credible threat of post-conflict relapse.

As a complementary bottom-up alternative to standard peacebuilding models traditionally promoted by international aid agencies, the intervention proposed here aims to explore a persuasion strategy to foster outgroup trust and trust in Government. The intervention targets these two dimensions of trust because they predict positive perceptions towards reconciliation, the most important process and final outcome of peacebuilding efforts. Both factors can play a crucial role in deactivating at least 2 of the 5 general post-conflict risks identified by the literature. Drawing on the recent literature, the goal of this intervention design is to the answer the question of how can trust effectively be fostered in a post-conflict scenario through the use of social norms.

The proposal also aims to tackle the methodological and empirical challenges implicated in integrating micro-level data to the post-conflict risk management and sustainable peacebuilding policy debate.

The Colombian case

In 2017, Colombia's Government and the oldest Guerrilla in the western hemisphere put a formal end to 52 years of Civil war and allowed the remaining 7.000 fighters of FARC to reintegrate into

the nation's life and politics. According to a study by Colombia's National Centre for Historical Memory (CNMH, 2016; 2010)⁵, the war between 1958 and 2013 has left as many as 220,000 dead, 25,000 missing persons, and 5.7 million displaced Colombians. In total, one in three of the 8.6 million registered victims of the conflict are children. The conflict has had a profound cost on social, environmental, economic (\$151 Billion), and political development. War has left the country facing a number of lost opportunities in the 5 last decades. However, the country faces its biggest chance ever as war seems to reach its termination: the possibility of successful and sustainable peacebuilding.

Colombia is a middle-income South American nation that may simply lack the institutional capacity necessary to fulfill its own landmark agreement to end the war. Challenges and sources of pressure are multiple and hard (Reardon, 2018). As discussed above, Colombians perceive theirs to be a weak state unable to deliver on promises made to its citizens in the past. Collier and Hoeffler (2008) that post-conflict peace is typically fragile: nearly half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses. The reduction of the risk of a recurring conflict is one of the two main challenges to be managed in order to avoid relapse. As depicted previously, societal violence, incentives for recidivism, the presence of illegal economies, and the absence of legitimate and trustworthy institutions to solve conflicts and enforce social order, are the main risks that Colombia as a transitional society may fail to reduce (Casas & Méndez, 2016).

The external-safeguards model proposed by the current government suffers from administrative limitations and fallbacks, vulnerability to political pressures in the ongoing electoral process, and the increasing lack of support to the peace process. In sum, peacebuilding in Colombia is fragile and faces two major structural problems: it is not designed as a preventive policy against post-conflict risks given its macropolitical focus; and, its short-term focus does not target the long-term benefit or cost to individuals that they do not consider when making the decision to support a policy, public good or service. The design fails to account for the role of internalities in the intertemporal endeavors that are integrated under the umbrella of a peace process.

⁵<http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2016/basta-ya-ingles/BASTA-YA-ingles.pdf>

of the populations involved, at risk of repeating the same mistakes of previous experiences⁶. It lacks a credible plan to generate the social infrastructures needed to avoid frustration and a violent relapse, given the country's economic and institutional features. Thus, a complementary model can be useful to deal with the post-conflict challenges.

This proposal builds from a previous research project I designed, directed and developed with the support of European Union, the Colombian Government, jointly implemented with the Colombian non-profit Corpovisionarios,⁷ founded by the iconic Antanas Mockus⁸. The project was designed as a “territorial policy experiment in reverse”: taking local actors as experts, the project aimed at building a national policy agenda for post-conflict peace building from the periphery (5 regions affected by war) to the center (the political capital in Bogotá), in a heavily centralized country (Casas, 2017) that inherited the administrative logics of internal colonialism (Marquard, 1957).

Casas et al (2018), draw on the evaluation of the New Peace Territories, a Governmental program implemented by Prosperidad Social with funding of the European Union⁹. Tejiendo Acciones de Paz (2017) project was oriented to the characterization and policy diagnosis in each one of the five departments involved in the program. Through the project we developed a data base line through the application of economic experiments and a post-game survey, focus groups, a representative survey and structured interviews to key actors, in order to obtain a complex vision of the social reality¹⁰. We used field adapted versions of the Trust Game and the Voluntary Contribution Game to measure social capital, pre and post-game surveys, focal groups and statistical analysis of Government data and from the *Nuevos Territorios de Paz* (New Territories of Peace) program led by the Colombian Government and the European Union.

⁶ An interesting recent view on this problem is explored by Reardon (2018) <https://www.nature.com/immersive/d41586-018-04976-7/index.html>

⁷ <http://corpovisionarios.org/?lang=en#Intro>

⁸ <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/opinion/the-art-of-changing-a-city.html>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33-4NRpowF8>

⁹ <http://www.prosperidadsocial.gov.co/pro/gd2/Paginas/Nuevos-Territorios-de-Paz.aspx>

¹⁰ The different instruments were applied in the departments of Atlántico, Magdalena and Bolívar, Guaviare and Caquetá. In total, the project had the participation of 4620 people, 2198 women, 2386 men and 36 who do not register gender information. This research proposal will use the excuse of a follow up on Casas (2017) project in order to develop the intervention inviting. The participants will be recruited from the previous sample involved in the agenda setting exercise that was developed as the end activity of the project.

After the data analysis was completed, the results were included in 5 educational participative workshops (1 for each region). They were oriented to present the results to local participants intentionally assigned into groups. The groups were exposed to a one day program including:

- a) training in the meaning and uses of the research techniques used in the project, and on basic data analysis for decision making;
- b) contrast between the project results and their own experiences in their territory through the use of a policy priority thermometer;
- c) Within-group deliberation of solutions for the challenges identified by the data and the collective building of a large scale fabric using weaving to fill a canvas in order to depict the desired policies for each territory (a tradition present across all regions of Colombia)¹¹; and
- d) socialization of group proposals at the end of the day. Through a voting mechanism all groups agreed on the Top 5 issues included in a regional proclamation, that in addition to the fabrics¹², constituted a local agenda for peace policies directed to the national government.

After the workshops were completed and the final outcome was integrated by the research team, a selected sample of participants were invited to Bogotá to discuss with and present the results to high-level officials of the policy agencies involved. As a result, Prosperidad Social and the European Union followed up as guarantors of the commitment made by agencies with each community and monitored that the solutions were implemented during 2017¹³.

The intervention

Is it possible to make peace not worse than war? Are other resources at the micro-level that can make peace more secure and long-lasting? How can these resources be used to manage post-

¹¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVWGCeOxYiw>

¹² Corpovisionarios has been well known for its Citizen Culture approach that blends art and science. In order to embrace local Colombian traditions, we used fabrics as the canvas to represent the territories and the aspects the communities identify as challenges and opportunities. Each fabric produced by each region was presented as part of the inputs for the workshop that the community leaders offered in Bogotá to officials from the National Government and international aid agencies in Bogotá.

¹³ The final report can be found at:

https://www.academia.edu/33269378/Capital_social_seguridad_convivencia_y_construcci%C3%B3n_de_paz_Un_an%C3%A1lisis_de_las_capa_cidades_institucionales_y_comunitarias_en_Atl%C3%A1ntico_Bol%C3%ADvar_Caquet%C3%A1_Guaviare_y_Magdalena

conflict risks locally in a cost-effective and sustainable manner? To further the previous activities and move to a new phase of the *Tejiendo Acciones de Paz* project, with the support of *Prosperidad Social*, the *European Union* and possibly USAID, the University of Pennsylvania will offer a short-course diploma on leadership, entrepreneurial and negotiation skills for small businesses and local startups. The intervention proposal draws on Paluck's (2009) intervention in Rwanda and will update and adopt specific aspects of local relevance. Her work provides the first clear evidence of the media's impact on intergroup prejudice and conflict in the world. She shows that in Rwanda a reconciliation radio program did substantially influence listeners' positive perceptions of new peacetime social norms. Normative perceptions were not empty abstractions but were realized by actual measured behavior, such as active negotiation, open expression about sensitive topics, and cooperation (Bicchieri, 2015). Moreover, this pattern carries a provocative implication for theoretical models of prejudice reduction: namely, that to change prejudiced behavior it may be more fruitful to target social norms than personal beliefs. Her findings suggest how a full understanding of the functional interdependence of the components of prejudice (beliefs, norms, and behaviors) can usefully structure a practical model of prejudice reduction.

Drawing on Paluck (2009), the intervention will aim at fostering warm dispositions among (out-) groups and toward public officials. It will do so through a randomized control trial that will serve as a pilot for future scalable purposes. It is oriented to test if exposure to an edutainment¹⁴ strategy, participants will adopt peacetime social norms eliciting outgroup trust and political trust. The general assumption relies on Bicchieri's (2005) argument, that a norm of trust/reciprocity can emerge in a situation in which different groups display different behaviors (epistemic uncertainty in low information environments), and how they may solidify into an equilibrium (reconciliation).

¹⁴ Media designed to [educate](#) through [entertainment](#). Most often it includes content intended to teach but has incidental entertainment value. It has been used by academia, corporations, governments, and other entities in various countries to disseminate information in classrooms and/or via television, radio, and other media to influence viewers' opinions and behaviors. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Educational_entertainment The 2015 World Bank report praised the use of edutainment for its capacity to transform mental models: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2015>. It has been also evaluated as an effective mechanism to reduce prejudice in the lab and the field (Paluck and Green, 2009:358)

Given the importance of community radios and military radio stations during the armed conflict and in local life¹⁵, as an adaptation of Paluck's (2009), the study is designed to identify the causal impact of a radio program in the most naturalistic manner possible, within a stratified sample of the population, and along theoretically meaningful outcomes (beliefs, norms, and behaviors) and possible processes of change (emotion and discussion), using various measurement tools.

A total of 300 Participants will be recruited from the sample of the *Tejiendo Acciones de Paz* project in the 5 regions of the country where the project was developed between 2015-2017. All the small cities and villages involved are home to victims, ex-combatants and non-affected citizens. Participants will be randomly assigned to the *treatment* or to the *control* condition (a family health skill program). It will rely on the exposure of half of the participants (150) to a reconciliation radio soap opera that will be piloted in 4 workshop meetings. The short series will depict the challenges and opportunities that a fictional village faces trying to deal with post-conflict risks. As in Rwanda local radios played an important role during war, but in the Colombian case community radios were source of social organization, protection and social action. They have great legitimacy among rural populations and reach in isolate sub regions and their operation is cost-effective.

In sum, the pilot will use the context of the leadership workshops to allow for contact, exposure and possibly perspective-giving and perspective taking between actors. The interaction may help measure the presence of affective trust. All these strategies have proved to be effective inside and outside of the lab for de-biasing and reducing discriminatory in-group / out-group dynamics (Paluck & Green, 2009).

Aimed at building social norms for peace the pilot will use an edutainment strategy (a soap opera) that will be piloted in 4 workshop meetings with the aim to reduce epistemic uncertainty towards the post-conflict phase. After the interventions it would be expected to observe support for local peace efforts, possible integrated entrepreneurship or new collaborative business endeavors related to productive projects and commercialization of local products between previously antagonizing groups (e.g. victims, demobilized ex-combatants from the guerrillas and the paramilitaries), and

¹⁵ These radios have a great penetration capacity into far away regions isolated by geographic factors or by the absence of basic infrastructure to connect with the regional centers.

positive attitudes toward local officials. To do an empirical follow-up measurement a second wave of the adapted *Acciones de Paz* multi-method strategy described above will be replicated to capture beliefs and norms (through the Security, Co-existence and Peace Survey, and focus groups) and behaviors (through economic and psychological experiments that allow to measure trust, collective action and discrimination, using different versions of the games implemented before (e.g. Trust Game and The Voluntary Contribution Game)).

The central *question* of the intervention that the framework aims to answer is:

Q1: *How can trust be fostered in post-conflict settings?*

Educational messages

The radio soap opera storyline educational messages aim at influencing listeners' beliefs about the roots and prevention of prejudice and violence, the challenges posed by post-conflict risks and their negative effects. Messages targeting the roots of prejudice and violence will be linked with the frustration of basic psychological needs (e.g., for security, a positive identity, and belongingness) and with how violence comes from factors like the lack of critical thinking, open dissent, active bystanders, and of meaningful intergroup connections. Messages about post-conflict risks will focus on the importance of cooperation between citizens and public officials to build institutions that can provide benefits for all in the long run and "bullet-proof" collective well-being and security.

The depiction of social norms

As described by Paluck (2009: 577), portraying the characters as typical, but realistically Colombian, the soap opera plans to change participants' perceptions of social norms by showing to listeners what their peers do (descriptive norms) and should do (prescriptive norms) in real post-conflict settings. The characters use popular proverbs and traditional songs and follow the routines of rural life, as most participants of the NTP program live in rural areas. Their key behaviors are revealed as they wrestle with problems known to all Colombians, such as cross-group friendships, overbearing leaders, poverty, and memories of violence. To depict the challenges of trust in

outgroups and the state, the main characters will adopt roles facing normative dilemmas in post-conflict risk management.

The short series will depict the challenges and opportunities that a fictional Colombian village faces trying to deal with post-conflict risks. The main ingredient of the soap opera will be a romantic liaison between a former ex-combatant and a school teacher who studied abroad and has great knowledge about how other societies dealt with the aftermath of war. The show will have several conflicting characters: a corrupt politician against peace, a criminal gang leader promoting unrest to recruit new gang members supporting his crooked cause, a victim, the local youth facing the temptation of easy money and power posed by a new criminal structure that offers illegal business, and a local pastor or priest dealing with his emotions of forgiving the wrongdoers who massacred his congregation and blow up his church. The plot will build on scripts and schemas (Bicchieri, 2015) that signal warm dispositions toward outgroups and public officials that commit to peacebuilding efforts, including a feud turned into friendship between former enemies (army veteran/guerrilla ex-combatant). The series will depict how peace is a fragile common good that like a crop needs collective effort and care in the long run to keep the region happy, healthy, safe and free.

The design of the soap opera will be in charge of the research team and a firm specialized in edutainment, with participation and approval of the Prosperidad Social/European Union Team.

Our general *hypothesis* H1 is that:

By fostering affective trust, the introduction of social norms can cue positive perceptions towards reconciliation, reducing the probability of critical post-conflict risks related to intergroup violence, the legitimacy of the peace process and compliance with the rule of law to avoid conflict relapse.

Supporting hypothesis:

H2: *As in Paluck (2009) program will not change listeners' beliefs with respect to program messages about trust, post-conflict risks, and reconciliation¹⁶.*

H3: *By portraying people and situations found in listeners' own lives, the reconciliation program should influence listeners' perceptions of descriptive norms regarding how Colombians do behave and prescriptive norms regarding how Colombians should behave in situations related to prejudice, post-conflict, and trust in real village environments.*

H4: *Behavior will change in the direction encouraged by the program—that people will be more willing to speak and even dissent about sensitive topics (e.g., community relationships, trust, and concerns about post-conflict risks) and to cooperate with one another, even across group lines.*

H5: *Affective trust will be observed through emotional and empathic reactions to radio characters and discussion that will amplify media effects.*

Experimental Procedure

As part of an extension of the *Tejiendo Acciones de Paz* project, the new phase will focus on generating leadership and entrepreneurial skills through a workshop conducting to a diploma sponsored by the European Government, Prosperidad Social and the University of Pennsylvania. The timeline of the project will be 3 months and it will offer 5-weekend sessions in which the experiment will be implemented.

The selected participants will be randomly assigned to the treatment (a radio reconciliation soap opera) or to a control group that will be exposed to a family health program promoting good practices and skills. All costs will be covered by the Colombian Government and the European Union. All materials will be adapted from Palluck (2009) and will be translated and contextualize to the cultural and social settings of the 5 regions covered by the project.

The monthly field visits will guarantee that participants listened to the program but preserving a neutral environment. Research assistants will sit and listen to the group as part of what is designed

¹⁶ This hypothesis will present a contradictory hypothesis already explored by Paluck in 2009. The big question it arises is how change is possible without belief change and what would be the explanation.

to be a casual community gathering. The group will share customary local drinks (purchased by the research team), and research assistants will not provoke or guide the discussion.

Research assistants will fill out observation sheets after they leave the site to record attendance and rate the group levels of (observable) enthusiasm, attentiveness, confusion, their emotional expressions, and the amount and type of discussion during and after the program. They will record how often participants discuss program themes (like intergroup prejudice, violence and trauma), specific post-conflict risks, and the state's capacity to manage them.

Data collection

Individual interviews. In the first session of the workshop, all participants will answer a survey depicting sociodemographic variables, and three modules using vignettes and Likert scales to measure attitudes, perceptions and behavioral intentions on (a) interpersonal trust, outgroup trust, and political/institutional trust; (b) attitudes toward peace and reconciliation; (c) a novel module on epistemic uncertainty and informational environment; (d) a self-identification of post-conflict risks in the region; and (e) charitable contributions to a specific cause. Social norms will be assessed through responses to nine statements measuring participants' beliefs with respect to the program's educational messages, and six statements measuring their perceptions of descriptive ("that is the way things are") and prescriptive ("that is the way things should be") norms portrayed in the radio program.

Control group. Questions about the health program used to assess the validity of the intervention, will include specific tests of whether the pattern of treatment effects reversed in favor of the control group on questions about health. Researchers will measure participants' empathy for public officials, ex-combatants and victims of violence with four statements probing whether participants "imagine the thoughts or feelings of prisoners, survivors, poor people, and political leaders".

Focus groups. Participants will be assigned to same-sex groups of 10, and will discuss four topics: trust, post-conflict risks, public policies for development. As with the individual interviews, the goal is to assess personal beliefs and perceptions of social norms. Researchers will repeat questions from the individual interviews in the focus group to test whether individuals are happy to voice the same opinions in front of their peers as they did privately.

Behavioral observation. Researchers will record group deliberations on how to share and supply batteries for the portable stereo and how to share the set of 4 CDs of the radio program presented to each community at the end of the data collection. Given the monetary and entertainment value of a portable stereo, this discussion is of great significance to the participants. The measure also captures spontaneous behavior that participants believed to be “off the record”—their discussions will take place during the goodbye party when the research team will gather with the participants to share drinks and socialize. To launch the discussion, one research assistant will present the stereo to the group and suggest that because they are all present they will decide how to share and supply it with batteries before parting ways. Two researchers will sit discreetly in the back of the group and record the participants’ ensuing discussion by hand.

Manipulation check will follow Paluck’s (2009) strategy also. Support for the general hypothesis will show a pattern of results that the end line outcomes will show the introduction of social norms presented in the program can cue positive perceptions towards reconciliation, reducing the probability of crucial post-conflict risks (intergroup violence, legitimacy of the peace process and compliance with the rule of law) aiming to avoid conflict relapse.

Data Analysis

The data analysis will follow Paluck’s (2009) strategy. I will use a nested statistical model to estimate the reconciliation program effect on individuals, using dummy variables for the blocks within which randomization occurred and preintervention covariates (Sex, birthplace, radio listening habits) from the pretest. A probit regression, which does not impose an arbitrary metric on the dependent variable, is preferable in this case to hierarchical linear modeling which is a linear model that presupposes a metric-dependent variable. The covariates will help to improve the precision with which the program’s effect is estimated but do not change the results. STATA’s robust cluster option accounted for the fact that errors are dependent within each cluster (community), allowing to estimate coefficients for individuals rather than groups and increasing the effective *N*.

To analyze the qualitative data, the research team will translate and type all focus group transcripts into a database where they will be matched with identifying codes for the site, the composition of

the group (e.g., sex, average age), and experimental condition. Using an a priori coding system devised by Paluck (2009) to capture desired and expected responses, an independent judge and a research assistant will code (blind to condition) every spoken turn. Each turn received from 0 to k codes, k is the total number of codes pertaining to the comment. The codes will be summed to Ordered probits using the same model presented above.

Following Paluck (2009) the pattern of results that would support the additional hypotheses is described as follows:

Influence personal beliefs. The explicit goal of the radio program is to promote the understanding of, and confidence in its messages, as in a public education campaign. Thus, the first hypothesis is that the program will not change listeners' individual beliefs with respect to program messages about trust, post-conflict risks, and reconciliation.

Influence perceived norms. By portraying people and situations found in listeners' own lives, the reconciliation program should influence listeners' perceptions of *descriptive* norms regarding how Colombians do behave and *prescriptive* norms regarding how Colombians should behave in situations related to prejudice, post-conflict, and trust.

Influence behavior. The third hypothesis is that behavior will change in the direction encouraged by the program—that people will be more willing to speak and even dissent about sensitive topics (e.g., community relationships, trust, and concerns about post-conflict risks) and to cooperate with one another, even across group lines. This behavioral change may be observed in conjunction with belief change, norm change, or neither of the two.

Empathy and discussion. Because neither empathy nor discussion will be experimentally manipulated in the present study, documenting emotional and conversational reactions to the radio program can point to possible processes of change for future investigation. The literature reviewed above might predict that emotional and empathic reactions to radio characters and discussion will amplify media effects, although the predictions for discussion are less clear. In this specific sense, a moderate (at least) demand effect is expected.

Extension after the pilot

My goal would be to escalate a bigger intervention to the regions of the country where “Transit Zones” have been established by the Colombian government for all FARC ex-combatants in order to facilitate the demobilization and reintegration process. The idea will be to implement a 6-month intervention using Penn’s leadership and economic skills workshop to replicate the *Tejiendo Acciones de Paz* to build local peacebuilding agendas, and expose participants to three additional treatments to the reconciliation soap opera: perspective sharing exercises (Bruneau et al, 2012), group malleability (Goldenberg et al, 2016), and cognitive reappraisal interventions (Halperin et al, 2013). It will be important to check the consequences of this intervention on cognitive losses as studied by Bogliacino et al (2017).

The aim of an expanded version of the intervention would be complete the tool-kit for a national wide policy oriented to locally manage post-conflict risks in the next 10 years, that has been described by Collier and colleagues as the most challenging period after war in terms of probable relapse.

IV. Discussion and final remarks

As Walter has argued (2011: 34) civil wars have become the dominant form of conflict in the world today in large part because they are so difficult to end and tend to recur. To date, the vast majority of literature on recurring civil war (including my own) has argued that certain countries are at risk of civil war relapse because the underlying economic and political conditions make them prime candidates. Her evidence shows that some countries manage to escape this conflict trap even when war has exacerbated many underlying conditions. One unexplored factor in the literature is related to the role of trust as a local enhancer to locally manage post-conflict risks from the micro-level. This paper proposes an intervention that triggers trust in order to foster local enhancers for peace and reduce the risk of post-conflict threats, specially intergroup conflict and violent relapse.

This paper has presented arguments and evidence in support of a complementary bottom-up alternative to standard peacebuilding models traditionally promoted by international aid agencies.

The framework and the intervention proposed here aim to explore a persuasion strategy to foster outgroup trust and political/institutional trust. The intervention targets these two dimensions of trust because they predict positive perceptions towards reconciliation, the most important outcome of peacebuilding efforts. Both factors can play a crucial role in deactivating at least 2 of the 5 general post-conflict risks identified by the literature. The main hypothesis is that *by fostering affective trust, positive perceptions of reconciliation increase, reducing the probability of critical post-conflict risks related to intergroup violence, legitimacy and compliance with the rule of law.*

The goal is to pilot how can a set of local enhancers for peace be built organically from the bottom-up to manage local post-conflict risks regarding outgroup conflict relapse and building what Sako (1998) denominates “the missing middle”: the absence of intermediate social groups that link reference groups and the large centralized organization. Drawing on the recent literature, the goal of this intervention design is to pilot the answer the question of how can effective trust be fostered in a post-conflict scenario using social norms. The results will contribute to different branches of study in public policy and the literature on conflict resolution, peacebuilding, international aid, and social capital by describing how behavioral assumptions on attitudes toward reconciliation matter for risk management in transitions. The results, if meaningful, the first step towards a novel bottom-up perspective that is relevant for low-cost policymaking and sustainable peacebuilding at the local level.

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Appendix

Table 1. Logistic regression models Representative Survey. Source: Casas, Méndez & Pino (2018).

Variables	DV Reconciliation		DV: peace agreement will be implemented	
	Model 1 (Coefficients)	Model 2 (Odds ratio)	Model 1 (Coefficients)	Model 2 (Odds ratio)
Age	0.000176** *	1.000**	0.000130***	1.000***
	(0.0003)	(.00003)	(0.00003)	(.00003)
Female	-0.376***	.686**	-0.190**	.829***
	(0.0937)	(.06429)	(0.0894)	(.0751)
Education	-0.0101	.989	-0.0623	.932
	(0.0474)	(.09093)	(0.0451)	(.0426)
Interpersonal Trust	0.138*	1.147*	0.0935	1.114
	(0.0792)	(.0870)	(0.0754)	(.0851)
Trust in ex-combatants	0.496***	1.641***	0.305***	1.372***
	(0.0530)	(.0870)	(0.0510)	(.0710)
Trust in victims	0.0377	1.03	-0.0132	.986

	(0.0504)	(.05229)	(0.0496)	(.0497)
Trust in National Government	0.415***	1.513***	0.476***	1.626***
	(0.0514)	(.0777)	(0.0489)	(.0806)
Community participation	0.162	1.176	0.130	1.126
	(0.101)	(.1184)	(0.0954)	(.1088)
Fiscal performance	0.380	1.462	-3.597	1.293
	(0.655)	(.95754)	(2.375)	(.5565)
Guerrilla should tell the truth	0.811***	2.249***	0.608***	1.86***
	(0.0971)	(.2183)	(0.0924)	(.1745)
<hr/>				
R-Square	0.20	0.20	0.11	0.14
Observations	2,619	2,572	2,566	2,575
<hr/>				

fixed-effects

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2. Logistic regression models Stakeholders Survey. Source: Casas, Méndez & Pino (2018).

Variables	DV: Negotiation		DV: Tolerance towards ex-combatants and victims	
	Model 1 (Coefficients)	Model 2 (Odds ratio)	Model 1 (Coefficients)	Model 2 (Odds ratio)
Age	-0.021 (0.015)	0.998 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.996 (0.006)
Female	0.483 (0.405)	1.620 (0.656)	-0.028 (0.167)	0.972 (0.162)
Education	-0.216 (0.206)	0.806 (0.166)	-0.039 (0.090)	0.961 (0.086)
Income	-2.940 (2.070)	0.999 (2.070)	-1.620* (9.450)	0.999* (9.450)
Trust in family	0.344 (0.336)	1.410 (0.473)	-0.308 (0.205)	0.735 (0.151)
Interpersonal trust	-0.280*	0.756*	0.002	1.002

	(0.232)	(0.175)	(0.112)	(0.113)
Trust in community	-0.186	0.830	-0.003	0.997
	(0.238)	(0.197)	(0.109)	(0.108)
Trust in victims	0.270	1.310	0.184*	1.202*
	(0.221)	(0.289)	(0.100)	(0.120)
Trust in ex-combatants	0.774**	2.169**	0.742***	2.101***
	(0.321)	(0.696)	(0.123)	(0.259)
Trust in government	0.366*	1.442*	0.179*	1.197*
	(0.213)	(0.307)	(0.095)	(0.114)
Participation	0.857*	2.355*	0.049	1.050
	(0.494)	(1.163)	(0.219)	(0.230)
Dpto. Bolívar	-0.048	0.953	0.697***	2.007***
	(0.760)	(0.725)	(0.265)	(0.533)
Dpto. Caquetá	-0.271	0.763	0.900***	2.459***
	(0.745)	(0.568)	(0.281)	(0.692)
Dpto. Guaviare	-0.614	0.541	0.359	1.432
	(0.655)	(0.354)	(0.245)	(0.351)

Dpto. Magdalena	-1.084	0.338	0.102	1.107
	(0.664)	(0.225)	(0.252)	(0.279)

Observations	580	580	846	846
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Pseudo R-squared	0.1161	0.1161	0.0930	0.0930
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Log-likelihood	-111.94	-111.94	-471.92	-471.92
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* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$